Skip to main contentTorts: Negligence - Causation
I. Causation in Fact (Review)
Before analyzing Proximate Cause, one must establish Causation in Fact. The standard tests are:
- The “But-For” Test: The primary test for causation in fact. One must ask: “But for the defendant’s conduct, would the plaintiff have been injured?”.
- Single Defendant: The “But-For” test always works to establish causation in fact.
- Multiple Defendants:
- Concurrent Causes: Two or more negligent acts concur to cause a single injury (e.g., a buggy with no lights and a car on the wrong side of the road collide). The “But-For” test works here; if either party had not breached, the accident would not have occurred.
- Alternative Causes: Two or more negligent acts occur, but the plaintiff cannot prove which specific one caused the injury (e.g., the “shotgun” example where two people shoot, and one pellet hits the plaintiff).
- Rule: The court shifts the burden of proof to the defendants to absolve themselves. If they cannot, they are held liable.
II. Proximate Cause (General Principles)
Proximate Cause is a distinct element from Causation in Fact. It is a policy-driven doctrine used to limit the scope of liability.
1. Black Letter Law
- Definition: Proximate cause is a legal doctrine that cuts off liability for harm—even though the harm was in fact caused by the defendant’s conduct—because it would be unfair or unjust to hold the defendant liable.
- The Primary Test: The test for proximate causation is the foreseeability of the particular type of harm.
- The Two Categories: Proximate cause cases are analyzed as either Direct Cause cases or Indirect Cause cases.
III. Direct Cause Cases
A direct cause case is one where the facts present an uninterrupted chain of events from the time of the defendant’s negligent act to the time of the plaintiff’s injury. There are no intervening forces present.
1. Rule: Foreseeability of Harm
- If a particular harmful result was at all foreseeable from the defendant’s negligent conduct, the unusual manner in which the injury occurred is irrelevant to the defendant’s liability, and the extent of damage is immaterial.
- However, if an entirely different and unforeseeable type of harmful result occurs, the defendant is not liable for that harm.
2. Key Cases
Ryan v. New York Central R.R. (1866)
- Facts: Defendant railroad negligently set fire to a woodshed. The fire spread to the plaintiff’s house 130 feet away.
- Holding: The Court found the damage too remote to allow recovery. (Note: This reflects an older view protecting industrial development).
In re Polemis
- Facts: A plank was negligently dropped into a ship’s hold, causing a spark that ignited petrol vapors, destroying the ship.
- Holding: The defendant was liable because the negligent act was the proximate cause of the fire, even though the exact operation of the harm (the spark) was not anticipated.
Overseas Tankship v. Morts Dock (Wagon Mound No. 1)
- Facts: Defendant’s ship discharged furnace oil into a harbor. The oil spread to a wharf where welding was occurring. Molten metal ignited cotton waste on the oil, causing a fire that damaged the wharf.
- Holding: The defendant was not liable. The court found that while damage from pollution (mess) was foreseeable, damage by fire was not a foreseeable type of harm for spilling oil on water.
Overseas Tankship v. Miller Steamship (Wagon Mound No. 2)
- Facts: Arising from the same incident as Wagon Mound No. 1, but the plaintiffs were the owners of ships docked at the wharf that also caught fire.
- Holding: The defendant was liable. In this litigation, evidence established that the defendants ought to have known that furnace oil could ignite on water. Therefore, fire was a foreseeable type of harm.
IV. The Eggshell Skull Doctrine (Take Your Plaintiff As You Find Them)
This doctrine applies within Direct Cause analysis regarding the extent of damages.
1. Black Letter Law
- Rule: A defendant must “take their plaintiff as they find them”.
- Application: If some physical injury to the plaintiff was foreseeable, the defendant is liable for the full extent of the damages, even if the plaintiff suffered more severely than a normal person due to a pre-existing condition (e.g., a thin skull or age).
- Limitation: The defendant is liable for the aggravation of a pre-existing condition, but not for the condition itself. However, liability only attaches if the type of harm is foreseeable (e.g., hitting a head causes skull fracture), not if an unrelated, unforeseeable ailment occurs (e.g., hitting a head causes ulcers).
2. Key Case
Bartolone v. Jeckovich
- Facts: Plaintiff suffered a minor whiplash injury in a car accident, which subsequently triggered a severe psychotic breakdown due to a pre-existing latent condition.
- Holding: The accident was the proximate cause of the mental illness. The defendant is liable for the aggravation of the pre-existing illness because they must take the plaintiff as they find them.
V. The Duty/Proximate Cause Intersection (Palsgraf)
This case bridges the gap between Duty and Proximate Cause, illustrating two different judicial approaches to limiting liability.
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.
- Facts: Railroad guards pushed two men onto a moving train. One man dropped a package containing fireworks, which exploded. The shockwave/vibration caused a heavy scale 60 feet away to fall on Ms. Palsgraf.
- Cardozo’s View (Majority - Duty): Liability is limited by Duty.
- The plaintiff was 60 feet away and outside the “Zone of Danger” (the area of increased risk of physical harm).
- Therefore, the defendant owed no duty to her because injury to her was unforeseeable.
- Andrews’ View (Dissent - Proximate Cause): Liability is limited by Proximate Cause.
- A duty is owed to the world at large.
- Liability should be determined by proximate cause based on a “rough sense of justice” and fairness, even if the specific plaintiff was unforeseeable.
VI. Indirect Cause Cases (Intervening Acts)
An indirect cause case exists when an intervening force is present between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injury.
1. Black Letter Law
- Definition: An intervening act is the act of a third person (or the plaintiff) that intervenes between the defendant’s negligent conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.
- The Rule of Liability:
- Not Superseding (Liability Continues): An intervening act will not interrupt the causal link (and the defendant remains liable) if the act is a normal, foreseeable consequence flowing naturally from the situation created by the defendant’s negligence.
- Superseding (Liability Cuts Off): An intervening act will interrupt the causal link (relieving the original defendant of liability) if the act is extraordinary, unforeseeable, and independent.
2. Types of Intervening Acts
- Plaintiff’s Own Conduct: The plaintiff’s own negligent act can be an intervening act.
- Subsequent Negligence: Any subsequent negligent act is an intervening act; the jury must decide if it is superseding.
- Example (Medical Malpractice): If a defendant injures a plaintiff, and the treating doctor commits malpractice, the original defendant is usually liable for the malpractice as well. Medical error is considered a foreseeable consequence of causing injury.
- Example (Third Party Driving): If an ambulance carrying the plaintiff is T-boned by a third party, liability depends on whether that accident was a natural flow of the situation or an extraordinary, independent event.
3. Key Case
Yun v. Ford Motor Co.
- Facts: The defendant’s defective spare tire assembly broke, causing the tire to fall on the highway. The plaintiff’s father (decedent) ran across the busy freeway to retrieve the tire and parts and was struck and killed.
- Issue: Was the decedent’s act of running across the highway a superseding cause that cut off Ford’s liability?
- Rule/Analysis: The court looked at whether the decedent’s conduct was “highly extraordinary.” If the intervening act (running across the highway) is extraordinary and unforeseeable, it breaks the chain of causation. This is generally a question of fact for the jury.
Next Step for User
Would you like me to generate a set of practice hypotheticals specifically testing the distinction between Wagon Mound No. 1 and Wagon Mound No. 2, or would you like to move on to the “Duty” chapter as foreshadowed in the Palsgraf discussion?